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INTRODUCTION 
 
The study of the infrastructure, as a development tool, has become an important issue in the 
public policy researchers and social development studies around the world. The case of 
Latin American and the Caribbean has been a focus of interest to  international cooperation 
institutions as the World Bank (2005) and The commission of UN to Latin America and the 
Caribbean (CEPAL, 2011).  So, since the last decade of the last century, there is a rapidly 
growing literature on infrastructure to development. Starting with the studies of Canning D. 
(1998) to the World Bank, and continue with the gap estimation made by Claderon and 
Serven (2002, 2004); however, this literature shows little agreement on the use of Private 
public Partnerships as a way to tend to close that gap. 
 
Previous research as Van Ham and Koppenjan (2001) has argued that the PPP are a 
significative tool used by the public sector in cooperation with the private sector, where 
both share risk, cost and resources, to provide public goods and services in the most 
possible efficient way. Under the same line authors as Donahue and Zeckhauser (2011) 
shown that the main objective of the PPP is the common development of the country and 
the active participation of the citizens in the decision taken process. On the other hand, an 
academic figure as Lipschutz and Rowe (2005) argues that the PPP, in a middle term, go 
against the traditional democratic values, as part of a clear interest of mercantilist all the 
political process of developing and government an undeveloped country. This thesis will, 
however, aim to show the feasibility of using public and private partnerships as a way to 
develop infrastructure projects in more the half part of the Colombia national territory, who 
has been affected by the narcotrafic and the conflict between the illegal armed groups, as 
part of the inclusion and reconciliation process. I will argue that PPP are an efficient tool, to 
improve the development in this area, considering limited resources. 
 
This thesis will contribute to our understanding of the PPP as a tool to improve the 
development process in Colombia. In addition, I will claim that the infrastructure gap in the 
half part of Colombia have to be close as a way to generate development and at the same 
time support the reconciliation process and as a system to support the fight against the 
illegal corps. So, this research will attempt to answer the following research question: Are 
the BTL public private partnerships an efficient tool, to close the infrastructure gap in the 
half part of Colombian territory and to promote the development of those areas, particularly 
in which the government wants to promote a policy of substitution of illicit crops? The 
focus of this thesis is to probe that the BTL-PPP are an efficient tool, to contribute to close 
the transporter infrastructure gap in these vulnerable areas of the country. The first part 
presents a literature review on public and private partnerships and infrastructure as a way to 
promote development. Next, I present the economic and social current situation in 
Colombia, empathizing in those departments whose has been affecting by the armed 
conflict, the presence of illegal corps as well as the incipient (or null) transport 
infrastructure connection.  Then, I examine the case of U.K, highlighting the experience of 
the M-25 or London Orbital Motorway.  Succeeding, using the M-25 case as a reference 
and keeping the validity legal and normative frame in Colombia I analyze from a 
comparative perspective the use of DBFO-PPP to develop transport infrastructure in those 
remote regions of the country with the experience of U.K Finally, I provide some 
conclusions of the investigation. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Public and Private partnerships (PPP) has been an area of active interest since the beginning 
of the last decade of the XX century.  According to David Hall (2015) the idea of private 
sector investing in public services data from the XIX century in public industries as 
railways, gas, water and electricity, nevertheless, the modern concept was invented during 
the Thatcher era in UK.  Since then the U.K have been used the PPP model in the provision 
of different services and in the supply of infrastructure requirements as roads and rails. 
Since the 1990S, PPP have begun to call attention to development banks, who at the same 
time introduce the concept in countries from the third world countries, particularly in Latin 
America.  
 
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to define clearly the key terminology referred to 
in this research paper.  As far as the secondary literature and this study are concerned, 
Public Private Partnerships (PPP) will refer as a risk-sharing relationship based on a shared 
aspiration between the private and public sector (Grismsey & Lewis, 2007; Osborne 2000). 
Previous research conducted by Van Ham and Koppenjan (2001) has argued that the PPP 
are a significative tool used by the public sector in cooperation with the private sector, 
where both share risk, cost and resources, to provide public goods and services in the most 
possible efficient way. Under the same line authors as Donahue and Zeckhauser (2011) 
have showed that the main objective of the PPP is the common development of the country 
and the active participation of the citizens in the decision taken process. On the other hand, 
an academic figure as Lipschutz and Rowe (2005) argues that the PPP, in a middle term, go 
against the traditional democratic values, as part of a clear interest of mercantilism of all the 
political process of developing and government an undeveloped country. 
 
The evaluation process of a PPP traditionally has been related directly with their economic 
performance, that’s why authors as Burger & Hawkesworth (2011) and Grimmsey & Lewis 
(2005) have examined a PPP according with its value for money aspects. In the same 
fashion, Tiong, Yeo & McCarthy (1992) and Zhang (2005) have claimed that the PPP only 
can be measurement under the critical success factor systems.  In contrast  this analysis 
pretend to use the variable of efficiency as the criteria of success, keeping in mind that in 
this particular case the PPP is expecting to work as a integration and reconciliation tool. 
 
There is a stark contrast between David Hall (2015) and The World Bank Group (2015). 
Hall argues that the infrastructure develop has to be supply just by the public institutions 
and using public finances for investment because under this way the positive externalities 
are going to be higher, particularly in the generation of formal jobs, also he claim that 
government can use taxes revenues as a cheaper and effective long-term finance. The 
World Bank (2015) gives a different perspective indicating that PPP can help to improve 
the quality of infrastructure in development countries that partially is deriving from the 
insufficient funding in the public sector also the negative impact of the financial crisis in 
the public finances of development countries, constrain their chances to access to long-term 
finance (World Bank, 2015).   Although Hall´s support strongly his perspective and seems 
coherent and efficient in (at least) medium level income country, we have to admit that the 
current budget in Colombia, with a deficit of 4% of the total GDP in 2016, makes 
impossible in the short term the supply of this type of transport infrastructure. Therefore, in 
this context the alternative of PPP seems an attractive route to improve and supply the 
infrastructure gap that it is the main concern of this study. 
 
Having discussed the concept of PPP, let us now turn to infrastructure as a development 
tool.  Infrastructure, as a development tool, has become an important issue in the public 
policy researchers and social development studies around the world. The case of Latin 
American and the Caribbean has been a focus of interest to  international cooperation 
institutions as the World Bank (2005) and The commission of UN to Latin America and the 
Caribbean (CEPAL, 2011).  So, since the last decade of the last century, there is a rapidly 
growing literature on infrastructure to development. Starting with the studies of Canning D. 
(1998) to the World Bank, and continue with the gap estimation made by Claderon and 
Serven (2002, 2004); however, this literature shows little agreement on the use of Private 
public Partnerships as a way to tend to close that gap. 
 Because I want to focus on the efficiency of the PPP in terms of feasibility as an effective 
tool to promote the reconciliation and integration of the half part of Colombia, I will not 
attempt to analyze or evaluate the PPP in terms of economic benefits and costs. This study 
does not attempt to include consideration of the provision of other services different to 
transport infrastructure. This paper will be limited to discussion on the PPP in the service 
purchase type (BTL) because make possible an intervention without a big initial investment 
of the government, so I am choosing to ignore the PPP concession type (BTO). For 
practical considerations and access to the information, this paper is limited to use as 
reference the U.K experience of implementation of PPP BTL type, particularly to the case 
of the M-25 motor way widen. Instead, the comparative analysis with other countries, with 
experience in BTL projects as Korea and Australia, could be the subject of future valuable 
research. 
Why the public private partnership alternative:  
The necessity for infrastructure development has been a constant since the binging of the 
history; consequently, the governments traditionally have been concern about this issue. 
Nonetheless, under limited resources and budgetary difficulties, most of the countries 
(particularly developing countries) prioritize other “strategic issues” like security, public 
debt, education, and other social issues, that necessarily has to been fulfilled in a short term.  
Therefore, the infrastructure investments use to be under-funded in many countries around 
the world.  The case of the countries in Latin America is not the exception, according to the 
Inter-American Development Bank “ the additional investment needed in infrastructure in 
Latin America amounted to $100 billion per year- Two percent of regional GDP over an 
extended period” (IDB, 2014). 
Under this scenario, the World Bank PPP Knowledge Lab suggests that PPP could be an 
interesting alternative to increase the fiscal space. However, the tool has to be well used. 
Hence, the institution suggests an evaluation about the alternatives considering the nature 
of the project. So if it is an User-pays contract, it will probably create a long-term fiscal 
space, on the other hand, a contract that includes availability payments create fiscal space 
only in the short term (PPP KnowledgeLab, 2017).  Furthermore, PPP can be used by the 
government as a financing mechanism to overcome short-term cash budget constraint by 
dispersal the costs over the lifetime of the project.  An interesting example of this is the N4 
toll road between Mozambique and South Africa where this two countries allows a single 
cross-border operator to maintain the road and serving user even though neither of two 
governments had enough found to do it in a short term.  
 
Another interesting example is described by William Maddex in his thesis “The rigor of 
negotiation; why public-private partnerships are effective” where he compared the use of a 
PPP project against the traditional Design Bid Build (DBB) method in the operation and 
maintenance of the Presidio Parkway in California, showing that after a value for money 
analysis the net calculated saving to the project cost was 147 million dollars. Subsequently, 
the PPP cost was calculated to be $488 million compared to $635 million for the DBB 
method, according to the author this could be explained by the differential in the risk-
adjusted construction costs of the two models, as well as, by the possibility of a better and 
rigorous negotiation performed in PPP projects. (MADDEX, 2012) 
 
 
 
 
COLOMBIA 
Country Snapshot 
Colombia is located in South America in a tropical area, border by Venezuela, Brazil, 
Panama, Ecuador and Peru, as well as by the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean.  With a 
population of 49.364.592 (according projection of the National Statistics Administrative 
department DANE. Retrieved 10 August 2017) and with 1,141,748 km2 of total land area, 
Colombia has a concentration index of 43, 9 habitants per sq. km of land area (World Bank 
data 2016). The country is currently growing at a rate between 2% - 3% according to the 
central Bank (Banco de la Republica de Colombia, 2017). 
1. Macroeconomic  
Colombia´s macroeconomic variables had been growing strongly since the first 
decade of the 2000´s and until 2009 when after the financial crisis the growing level 
decrease, however has never experimented a negative growing rate in the last 
decade. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as at 2016 stood at US$ 282.46 
(billions) which represent a real growth rate of 1,7% reducing from earlier rates of 
3,1%  and 4,4% in 2015 and 2014 respectively  (World Bank, 2017). The GDP per 
capita has been also decreasing form US $7,913 in 2014 to US $5,806 in 2016 while 
the inflation rate has increased from 3,2% in 2012 to 7,5% in 2016 (World Bank, 
2017. 
The Colombia´s 2016 negative (-) account balance was US$12.541.083.843 which 
is a reduction from the 2015 current account balance of negative (-) 
US$18.780.374.304. However, since 2015 the public debt has reduced from 50,6% 
of GDP in 2015 to 50,2% in 2016 and a present estimated value of 48,5% of GDP.  
2. Business Climate: 
A factor who determines the grade of private investment in the public sector is the 
business climate.  Globally the business climate is measured by the following indices: 
2.1. Rule of Law Index:  
This index, in a scale of 0 to 1, uses the experiences of a group of expert, as well as, 
the general public opinion to measure the rule of law across different countries. In 
the index 1 means solidest adherence to rule law.  For the case of Colombia, the 
country scored 0, 55 in 2014, decreased to 0, 50 in 2015. Currently, Colombia is 
scored 0, 51 in 2016 (World Justice Project, 2016). 
2.2. Corruption perception Index: 
In a scale from zero (0) to one hundred (100) the corruption perception index (CPI) 
measures corruptions perception in criticizes among several countries.  Colombia 
has ranked 90th out 176 countries with a score of 37 in 2016.  Unfortunately the 
Colombia’s index has been increasing since 2013 when the score was 36, risen to 
37 since 2014 (Transparency International, 2017). 
2.3. Business Freedom Index 
The Business Freedom is an indicator between 0 and 100, were 100 is the best 
freedom environment for business. The index measures the difficulty to starting, 
operating and closing a business. (The Heritage Foundation, n.d). 
Colombia with a score of 69, 7 is 37 in the global rank, been classified as 
“moderately free”. Since 2015 the country has been losing place in the rank. 
However in average is seen to have scarcely fluctuated since 2012. 
2.4. Global Competitive Index 
The Global Competitiveness Index evaluates the competitiveness of 138 economies. 
The index scored each economy from 1 to 7, been the last one the most competitive. 
To build the index, the World Economic Forum analyzes the institutions and 
policies who affect the productivity level of the economy.  
Colombia has marginally ascending in the rank from the 66th position with a score 
of 4,23 in 2015 to a 61st place in 2016 with a score of 4,28, and 4,30 in 2016 
keeping the same position in the global rank. (World Economic Forum, 2017).  
3. Fragility: 
Even though Colombia has been facing an internal conflict since the middle of the last 
century, it´s democracy index is in average similar to the other countries in the region 
graded by the Economist Intelligence 
Unit’s Democracy Index with 6.67 points 
in 2016, value compatibly higher against 
the score of 6.62 in 2015 and 6.55 in 
2014 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2017). However, it is a fact that the 
FIGURE 1 Source: United Nation Office on Drugs and 
Crime 
country is living a currently episodes of social instability, particularly in some regions 
with a lack attendance  of the central government and with a strong influence of illegal 
economies, in particular the farming of illegal corps (Coca and marijuana). Those areas 
are particularly concentrated in the departments in the south of the country as Nariño, 
Cauca and Putumayo, as well as in the border with Venezuela, in the north and in the 
border with panama in the department of Antioquia.  
 
3.1 Narcotrafic:  
Since the decade of the 70´S of the last century the traffic of illegal drugs has been an 
issue in the political agenda of the country. At the beginning Colombia was just the port 
to move the drugs from Peru and Bolivia to United States. Nevertheless, at the ends of 
the 70´S the biggest criminal structures, dedicated to traffic of illegal drugs, appear and 
at the same time supported the introduction of massive  illegals crops and the 
transformation, production and traffic of illegal drugs as well. These criminal structures, 
denominated “Carteles”, were persecuting by the Colombian central government, 
supported by the government of United States until the ends of the 90´S when this 
biggest structures almost mutated to many smaller structures dispersed across the 
country, with particular interest in those areas strategic for this illegal economy, 
particularly the borders with Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama, always looking for 
weakest governmental structures and easy access to ports in the Caribbean sea and the 
pacific  coast.  
 
3.2 Internal conflict: 
Since the independence of the country in the XIX century, Colombia has been living a 
constant tension between different social, political and economic perspectives, and 
unfortunately most of them have been ending in internal conflicts and civil wars. So the 
phenomenon of the guerillas has been a constant in the history of the country. 
Nonetheless, the situation got worst with the narcotraffic, because most of these groups 
found an important source of financial support. So after the decade of the 80´S the 
guerrillas in Colombia get stronger military and economically. During the last decades 
of the last century guerrillas as the M-19, ELN and FARC-EP attacked governmental 
institutions, oil and energetic infrastructure and small and medium towns, particularly 
those far away from the biggest urban centers. 
At the end of the century the government signed a peace agreement with the guerrilla of 
the M-19 and recently agrees another one with FARC-EP and is in the middle of a 
negotiation with the ELN, so the violence and the affectation to the physical 
infrastructure has been dismounting and the security perception in the most develops 
regions in the country is increasing. Contrariwise the violence and the illegal economy 
in the most undevelopment regions has been increasing, because without the guerrillas 
new local actors are fighting each other to get the control of the areas, particularly those 
with illegal crops, situation that is getting worst because the lack presences of the state 
and the central government in those areas.  
 
4. Transportation Infrastructure: 
The deficiency of the transportation infrastructure has been an issue since Colombia 
exists as an independent republic. Many articles agree that the lack of transportation 
infrastructure impact negatively in the competitive index of the country. According to 
the World Bank between the 
20% and 30% of the over 
cost in the national 
production is because the 
poor quality of the 
transportation infrastructure. 
In the Global 
Competitiveness Index 
2017-2018 Colombia is ranking in the 98th place, under many countries of the region 
such as Panama, Mexico, Chile, Ecuador, Brazil and Peru. With a score of 3.1 in 
transportation infrastructure, situation that is getting worse in issues like quality of 
roads (3.0) and quality of railroad infrastructure (1.5). The contrast is dramatically 
when it is compared with one of the top 20 countries ranking like the United Kingdom 
whose score is 5.5 in transportation infrastructure and 5.1 in quality of roads. 
 
PPP Experience: 
Even though the Public and Private Partnerships (PPP) has been a recurrent tool to develop 
infrastructure in Colombia since the political constitution of 1991, it was not until January 
of 2012 with the law 1508, when the government created a regulatory frame exclusively to 
FIGURE 3 Source: World Bank, 2016 
FIGURE 2  Source: WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM,   
FIGURE 4 Source: World Bank, 2016 
regulate the PPP.  This was because the current government has been trying to keep the 
positive economy growing rate, even though the fall of the oil price has been affecting the 
economy and the public finance. So the PPP is part of the strategies to maintain the 
inversions levels in the country.   
According to data provide World Bank (PPP Knowledge lab, 2017) the amount of the 
investment in PPP, since the last decade of the last century until now, is around $33,181 
US$ million, with 132 active projects (Those projects whose  are under construction or 
operating). While recently the focus of the government is the development of transportation 
infrastructure, traditionally the projects have been disseminated in different sectors as 
Energy, communications and water and sewerage.  Consequently, the experience of the 
country in this type of project is not short, in fact there are some of this projects who have 
achieved all the cycle and are in the last period of the concession period.  
Unfortunally, during these 
years the system has faced 
corruption scandals, such 
cases where privates 
companies used to pay 
suborns to highest public 
officer to receive projects 
with representative’s cases as 
“The road of the Sun” with the Brazilian company Odebrecht and the development of the 
third phase of the Bus rapid transit system in Bogota, because of the last one the Bogota’s 
Mayor of that time is currently in jail, after a long trail where he and his brother (a senator 
at that time) where found guilty in one of the most infamous case of corruption in the 
country. Nonetheless, the government has been developing policies to regulate the PPP and 
attract more private investors.   
According to Mauricio Rodriguez Munera, ambassador of Colombia to the United 
Kingdom and founder and former director of Portafolio, Colombia’s most prominent 
economic and financial newspaper, the singular interest of the government in the PPP, is 
because it seems and attractive alternative to overcome the low quantity and quality of 
infrastructure development in the country (Infrastructure Journal, June 2012). That’s why 
the Colombian government has been working in a strongest regulation frame that includes 
the creation of the Colombia´s National Infrastructure Agency (ANI) and the law 1508 of 
2012, the PPP Law.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE PEACE 
 
The inefficiency of the transportation infrastructure system is not a recent issue in 
Colombia, in fact since the end of the XIX century, the lack of roads and efficient 
transportation system has defaulted the governability among many areas of the country, 
consequently most of those areas have been facing more difficulties to achieve a minimum 
development standard, becoming less competitive and economically inefficient.  In this 
context emerged different types of social movements, who used the inefficiency of the 
central government as a platform for revolutionary and insurgent movements, or even for 
movements who claim for independence.  Even though, traditionally the central 
government has insisted in focusing all their investments to develop infrastructure in the 
most economically active zones, particularly in the infrastructure to connect the center of 
the country, Bogotá, with the ports in the Caribbean area and some other productive areas, 
most of them in the Andina region. Therefore,   the infrastructure in almost half of the 
national territory is almost inexistent, generating that those areas became in our days the 
center of illegal economies and insurgent movements. 
 
An interesting example of this absence of the state is Tumaco, a municipality located on the 
Pacific coast at the south of the country.  In our days, Tumaco is perhaps one of the most 
violent places in Colombia, plus the area who more illegal crops concentrated. At the same 
time is one most abandoned municipalities, so their habitats traditionally has been facing 
difficulties in the receptions or even the non-existence of public services like electricity, 
clean water, and sewage system.  The lack of transportation infrastructure makes that legal 
economies as fishing and cacao harvests became inefficient and unprofitability. 
Consequently, the illegal crops and the production of cocaine turn into the base of the 
economy in the region. So the central government has been focusing their efforts in forcing 
the farmers to substitute the illegal crops by legal crops, however, as it was mention before, 
the lack of infrastructure and investment in new farmers or fishing technologies makes 
unprofitable and inefficient any type of legal economies (MOLANO, 2016)1.  
 
 
After the sign of the peace agreement between the central government and the terrorist 
movement of FARC-EP, everyone was expecting that the social situation of Tumaco will 
improve however instead of getting better the situation has been getting worst. That’s 
because, with the absence of the FARC-EP controlling the illegal economy, many medium-
size illegal movements start to fight against each other and against the central government 
to assume the control of the illegal economy. Additionally, the central government has been 
neglect in the exercise of their functions in the area as well as in providing real an efficient 
alternative to the people from Tumaco to substitute those illegal crops.  
 
According to The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) there is an 
agreement that conflict, fragility, and development are interlinked (UNOPS, 2017), 
consequently, cases as the Tumaco are an example of how low levels of development 
generate and feed conflicts, nonetheless the study of the incidence of transportation 
                                                          
1 MOLANO, Alfredo.  “La otra cara de la sustitución de cultivos” (The other side of crop sustitution). 11 JUN 
2016. https://colombia2020.elespectador.com/pais/la-otra-cara-de-la-sustitucion-de-cultivos  
infrastructure development on conflict resolution is still under development and has a 
limited record track.  The UNOPS understand the importance of infrastructure development 
as “more than just a physical output. Rather, infrastructure is an increasingly important 
element, or mediator, in the way in which social actors organize themselves. Infrastructure 
can only become effective in society; if it is ‘connected’ to other processes and networks. In 
other words, ‘infrastructure is something that emerges for people in practice, connected to 
activities and structures.” (UNOPS, 2017)2. Consequently, and before to continue, it is 
important to emphasize that the transportation infrastructure is not a panacea for cases like 
Tumaco´s and probably will not have any effect on the peacebuilding process, without the 
support of the other public institutions. However, it is clear that without this infrastructure 
development, the situation is far away to get better. 
 
Many international experiences, like the Center Africa Republic and Afghanistan, have 
shown the importance of roads and highways as a way to extend the geographical reach of 
state authority of the central government, as well as a tool to extend the security provision 
into conflict-affected zones. According to Ian Taylor, there is evidence that supports the 
link between the absence of infrastructure with conflicts, and at the same time, the author 
insists in the historical key role that infrastructure development has played in the 
consolidation of the modern strong states. (TAYLOR, 2014)3. Nonetheless, the experiences 
led by UNOPS have shown that it is also important to include local communities as a part 
of the decision-making process in this type of projects, other ways, it will be a high risk of 
                                                          
2 UNOPS AND DIIS. Roads to Peace? The Future of Infrastructure in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States. 
Copenhagen, January 2017, 
3 Taylor, Ian. “Evidence of the Contribution to Stabilisation of Trans¬port Infrastructure.” (London: DFID, 
2014). 
generating new conflicts and new problems. At this point, it is important to remember that 
every infrastructure project will impact in economic, political, social and environmental 
areas. So it is necessary an agreement in the way and in the costs (not only economic but 
social and environmental as well) that all the community are willing to pay to accomplish 
the infrastructure requirements for economic competitiveness.  
 
To conclude this section, it is important to insist on the necessity of transportation 
infrastructure development as a way to overpass the conflict and the illegal economies, 
originated in the narcotraffic, in Colombia. However many experiences have shown the 
importance of including the local society in the decision-making process, as well as the 
necessity of considering the environmental impacts. In this particular point it is important 
to considerate to the cost of do nothing, in Colombia the narcotraffic and other illegal 
economies around the deforestation have been causing the biggest environmental impact in 
the tropical forest, particularly in the Amazon area, according to Colombian antinarcotic 
police in 15 years were affected more than 608 000 hectares of jungle by illegal crops 
(POLICIA NACIONAL, 2014) 4 . However, that does not mean that infrastructure 
development has to be done at any cost, in fact, UNOPS has been working in infrastructure 
development models that “make sure that infrastructure delivery does not exceed the 
bounds of negative determinations during construction, they have limited bearing on the 
broader environmental impact of infrastructure use after completion. At the same time, the 
impact of infrastructure projects is often positively assessed in terms of indicators of 
economic growth, usually counted in terms of traffic intensity” (UNOPS, 2017). 
                                                          
4 POLICIA NACIONAL.  COCA: Deforestación, contaminación y  pobreza (COCA: Deforestation, pollution and 
poverty). Colombian National Printing. Bogotá D.C. 2014 
  
THE M-25 OR LONDON ORBITAL MOTORWAY WIDENS EXPERIENCE 
The use of PPP in transportation infrastructure it is not an unknown spectrum for many 
governments in our days, countries like Australia, Korea, Germany and U.K has 
experimented a lot of successful experiences in this area, even Colombia has been a point 
of reference of the use of PPP in the region. Nonetheless, most of the experiences in PPP 
has been closer to the Build Transfer and Operate (BTO) model, so it is not easy to find 
experiences of PPP in transportation infrastructure using models like the Build Transfer 
Lease (BTL) as well as the Design Build Finance and Operate (DBFO) model. In this way, 
perhaps U.K has been at the vanguard and one interesting example is the widen of the 
London Orbital Motorway. 
  
The M25 or London Orbital Motorway is one of the most important Highways in United 
Kingdom.  Located around London and with an extension of 188 km and recorded by an 
average of 200,000 vehicles in a busy day (according to Highways Agency), the M25 is the 
second largest orbital road in Europe.  Originally design during the earliest first half of the 
XX century, was not until the beginning of the 70´S when finally the   construction began, 
starting to operate in 1986 as a dual motorway with  three lines.  Nevertheless, 7 years after 
the begging of the operation, in 1993 the national media reported that the traffic exceed the 
double that was expected (The Independent, 1993). Consequently in 1995 started the plans 
to expand from six to eight lines the Highway, with the contract of widen the section 
between Junctions 8 and 10 for a cost of £93.4 million. Nevertheless, to   expand the 
section between junctions 5–6 and 16–30 the Highways Agency proposed a Design, Build, 
Finance and Operate (DBFO) project in 2006. 
 
The Design, Build, Finance and Operate (DBFO) public and private partnership model, as 
the Build  
Transfer Lease (BTL), is a public service delivery type where the private assume the 
responsibility of providing the service during a considerable period of time (Alshawi, 
2009) 5  the particularity of the DBFO model is that the private partner assume the 
responsibility of the total finance of the project and operation during the concession period. 
Nonetheless, the government is the real owner of the project since the beginning of them. 
The private expect to recover the investment and to make profitability using the cash flow 
from the periodical payment from the government during the concession time.  In the case 
of the M25, the Highways Agency used the DBFO model after analyze which private 
finance initiative (PFI) model offer the best value for money. At this point it is important to 
mention that the UK Highways Agency has a history on PFI projects, according to Paul 
Davies only in2013 the Highways Agency has approved other 10 roads under the DBFO 
model (Davies and Carr, 2009)6 .  
 
The case of the widening of the M25 project is interesting because to make profitable and 
more stimulating the project to the private sector, The Highways Agency integrated into a 
                                                          
5 ALSHAWI, Mustafa. Concept and Background to Public Private Partnership (PPP)/Private finance Initiative 
(PFI) UK experience.  https://www.oecd.org/mena/47562550.pdf 
6 DVIES Paul and CARR John. “M25-Lessons and challenges”.  Published in PFI Infrastructure Report. 2009 
http://edition.pagesuite-professional.co.uk/Launch.aspx?EID=12a6ce9e-7b65-476c-b2f6-56547c3a017b 
single plan the widening project with the maintenance and operations of the highway, 
including motorways and trunks roads that intersected with the highway.  Only in that way 
and with a concession period of 30 years the Agency will obtain the best value of the 
project as a private finance initiative. Nonetheless, according to Paul Davies and John Carr 
it was not clear how the financial market would assume and could be interested in one of 
the most expensive DBFO project at the time, in this issue the financial sector demand as a 
prerequisite that in first place the Highways Agency will include a clause of compensation 
in case of termination due default. In the second place, the demand risk of the project 
should be assumed by the public partner (Davies and Carr, 2009). On the other hand and 
considering the contractor’s capacity, as well as, the congestion impact of the project, this 
was divided into four sections and the price will be fixed only in the case of the initial 
sections, and the other will be built up by the DBFO company, according to the time of the 
beginning of the construction and the experience of the initial sections. 
 
The M25 was the first DBFO in UK where, because the size of the project, the bidders only 
had to submit their funding plans for the initial sections; this was because the Agency found 
that keeping the commitment fees in a long term could affect negatively the value for 
money of the project.  Nevertheless, the Bidders had to submit evidence of the funding 
plans, and also include supports from the potential senior funding adviser.  
 
In June of 2008 the project was given to the consortium “Connect Plus” with the HSBC as 
a financial adviser; however it was not clear that the commercial bank will be able to 
assume the total cost of the project, so the public partner had to prepared to provide up to 
£ 500M of senior debt itself as a co-founder.  Even though, at the end of the period, this 
public found was not require, it provides a sign of commitment from the public sector that 
that generated trust in the project by the financial sector and acceptable risk levels. These 
experiences were really important for the Agency and for the UK government in general 
because it was the beginning of Treasury´s new infrastructure finance unit (TIFU), figure 
that since then it has been using in many new projects in U.K.   
 
In the end, the project was a success after many negotiation hours with different actors who 
guaranty the necessaries founds. The agreement included the participation of 16 
commercial banks, which provided £700m of commercial bank debt and a £215m EIB 
guarantee. Also a £185m unguaranteed EIB structured finance facility. Finally, the 
partnership contract included a “mechanism whereby some of the cash not needed for debt 
service is rebated back to the government. On base case assumptions, £170m will be 
rebated back to the Highways Agency over the life of the contract” (Davies and Carr, 2009).   
 
To conclude this section it is important to mention that this particular project has been the 
target of many critics, most of the argued that the cost of the PPP project was higher than if 
the project would be done only by the public sector. However, the magnitude of the project 
and the particular financial system are an interesting example of success in a big 
transportation infrastructure project where the private partner assumed the construction risk 
and the government the operational.  This experience could be interesting in cases where an 
infrastructure requirement exists but the market will have not any interest at least that the 
government plays an active role as a partner. This experience also teaches us about the 
importance of strongest public institutions that guarantees acceptable uncertainty levels, as 
well as a legal security frame, as a way to attract private investors in public infrastructure 
projects. 
 
 
FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: M-25 AGAINST COLOMBIA 
The use of the model followed by U.K in the M-25 could represent an interesting 
alternative for the Colombian government in the way to achieve the transportation 
infrastructure development in those areas who have been affected by the conflict. 
Consequently, it is necessary to analyze from different perspectives the strongest, weakness, 
opportunities and threats that a model like this would face if it would be implemented in the 
Colombian case.    
Strongest 
Though Mexico, Brazil and Chile, Colombia is part of the biggest economies in Latin 
America. Therefore, the country has been developing policies to attract investors, 
contending with their pars in the region.  Additionally, after the peace agreement in 2016, 
the national government has settled new policies to improve the investment in those regions 
of the country whose had been affected by the conflict, most commonly known as ZOMAC. 
So in these days, Colombia has one of the best investment environments in the region and 
perhaps one of the strongest issues from a comparative perspective.  
 
In 2017 with the decree 1650 the Colombian government created the Most Affected by the 
Conflict Zones (ZOMAC), where the government planned to give tax benefit and technical 
support to those companies whose move there and develop their economic activities in the 
area.  The main propose of the initiative is to generate employment and economic 
development in those areas who have been affected by the violence during more than 50 
years.  According to the finance minister at the time Mauricio Cardenas “There are 344 
municipalities that will have a faster way to development, facilitating the arrival of different 
companies thanks to the attractive tax benefits. The most important thing: it will not only 
be for the agricultural sector. They will be able to set up businesses in commerce, transport 
services, construction, real estate activities, tourism, education, health, workshops, dealers, 
telecommunications” (Portafolio, 2017) 7. Hence, according to the decree and to the law 
1918 of 2016, in these areas, the discount in the income tax could be around 50% in the 
case of big company and almost 100% to small and middle companies.  
 
On the other hand, and in the way to achieve the same goal of attracting private investment, 
the central government with the law 935 of 2005 created the figure of the legal stability 
contracts (CEJ) in the country. The idea of this new tool is to guarantee to the investor the 
stability and the safety of their inversion.  So, the investor has to determinate the most 
important norms or regulation frame, whose definitely will affect their investment and the 
government, will guarantee that if the norm is modified they will apply the norm that was 
guaranteed under the CEJ, during the validity of the contract, which can be between 3 to 20 
                                                          
7 PORTAFOLIO. ¿Cómo acceder a beneficios tributarios a través de las ZOMAC? (How to access tax benefits 
through the ZOMAC?). October 10 of 2017. http://www.portafolio.co/economia/que-son-las-zomac-y-
como-beneficiarse-de-ellas-510498   
years (Procolombia, 2017) 8 . The investment amount has to be equal or higher than seven 
thousand and five hundred (7500) current minimum monthly salaries. 
 
This type of contracts provides to the investor legal stability and security, but at the same 
time, the Colombian governments ensure the investment in the country and also attract new 
direct foreigner investments.  Those achievements are possible without affecting the 
independence and the possibility of the legislative to modify or create new ordinary laws in 
the future, just provide the possibility of exception in particular cases according to the CEJ. 
Until now, most of the norms that have been stabilized have been directly related with tax 
stability followed by those related with the customs regimen (Guzman, page 07)9.   
Weakness: 
The case of the M25 showed the importance of a strongest public institution as an 
important tool to generate confidence and attract a private investor. The experience and 
knowledge of the UK Highway Agency made possible the structuration of one of the most 
important DBFO project in Europe. It is important to remember that the technical and 
finical condition of the project, particularly the issue related with the financial plans where 
the bidders only have to submit the plan that only included the funding for the initial 
section of a big project of four sections (Davies and Carr, 2009)10,  made imperative that 
                                                          
8  PROCOLOMBIA. Contratos Estabilidad Jurídica (Legal Estability Contracts). 
http://www.inviertaencolombia.com.co/zonas-francas-y-otros-incentivos/38-zonas-francas-y-otros-
incentivos/zonas-francas-y-otros-incentivos/92-contratos-estabilidad-juridica.html 
9 GUZMAN, Andrés.  Contratos de estabilidad jurídica en Colombia. Análisis de la ley 963 de 2.005 (Contracts 
of legal stability in Colombia. Analysis of law 963 de 2.005). 
http://190.242.62.234:8080/jspui/bitstream/11227/1229/1/Ensayo%20Estabilidad%20Jur%C3%ADdica%20-
Anderson%20Marrugo%20Guzman.pdf 
10 DVIES Paul and CARR John. “M25-Lessons and challenges”.  Published in PFI Infrastructure Report. 2009. 
Pag. 3.  http://edition.pagesuite-professional.co.uk/Launch.aspx?EID=12a6ce9e-7b65-476c-b2f6-
56547c3a017b 
the institution in charge of evaluating the bidders and the project had to have minimum 
qualification in terms of experience, knowledge, independence, and transparency to make 
the project viable and attractive for private investors . Since April of 2015, the Highway 
Agency evolved into a public company knows as Highways of England, with this change 
the governments pretend to provide more autonomy and efficiency to the way how the 
government administrated and improve their national Highways.  
 
In the Colombian case, the National Infrastructure Agency (ANI) plays the same role as 
Highways of England. Created in 2011 as a decentralized institution, the ANI has the 
objective to plan, evaluate, design, built, operate and administrate public projects as well as 
public-private partnership projects in transportation infrastructure.  The idea of the 
institution was to create a strongest and independent agency that improve and contribute to 
overcoming the lack of efficiency in terms of transportation infrastructure in Colombia. 
Nonetheless, since their creation, the institution has been a victim of corruption, lack of 
efficiency and misadministration. Consequently, the former and first president of the ANI, 
Luis Fernando Andrarde, has been facing disciplinary and legal accusation of corruption in 
the middle of a scandal with the multinational Odebretch, who admitted to paying bribes as 
a way to get the build contract of one of the most important transportation infrastructure 
projects in Colombia (El Pais, 2017)11. 
 
                                                          
11 EL PAIS.COM. “Imputarán cargos a Presidente de la ANI en caso Odebrecht” (They will charge charges to 
the President of the ANI in Odebrecht case) 27th July of 2017. 
http://www.elpais.com.co/colombia/imputar%C3%A1n-cargos-a-presidente-de-la-ANI-en-caso-
odebrecht.html 
Unfortunately, this is not something new, in fact, the ANI appear in 2011 as a way to 
replace the former institution knows as Concessions National Institute (INCO) who were 
qualified as a “cave of thieves”  by the Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos (EL 
HERALDO, 2017)12. The INCO was created in 2003, by the government of Alvaro Uribe 
Velez, the main objective of the institution was to be in charge of funding the planning and 
execution of road, river, sea, rail, and port transportation projects in the country, however 
the lack of efficiency and quality of many of the projects who were developed by the 
Institution made that the Santos government with the support of the Andina Development 
Corporation (CAF), transform the institution into the new ANI.   Nonetheless, in both 
situation, the agency has been and appendices of the presidential office, without the 
necessary independence and technical support to reduce the corruption and lack of 
efficiency risks. Consequently, the weakness of the institution necessary would increase the 
risk for the private investor, so probably the complex structure of the financial plan of a 
project like the M25 widening could be unattractive to the private financial partner.    
 
The lack of Independence of the ANI probably would not be the strongest weakness if the 
corruption index would not be high.  However, according to Transparency International, 
Colombia was ranking in 2017 in the 96th place of 180 countries with a score of 37, below 
other pars in the region as Uruguay (23), Chile (26), Costa Rica (38) and Argentina (85).  
According to Fernando Cepeda, who has been studying the phenomenon of corruption in 
                                                          
12 EL HERALDO. “Santos dice que con la ANI desapareció la “cueva de ladrones” que era el Inco” (Santos says 
that with the ANI the "cave of thieves" that was the Inco disappeared) March of 2017. 
https://www.elheraldo.co/bolivar/santos-dice-que-con-la-ani-desaparecio-la-cueva-de-ladrones-que-era-el-
inco-333545 
Colombia, the main causes of the corruption in the country are Inefficiency, lack of control 
and cultural issues (Cepeda, 1997)13.  
 
Cepeda argues that perhaps the most important cause of the corruption is the inefficiency of 
the State to provide services to the society, so it generates incentives in the people to offer 
money to the public officer as a way to receive easily the service.  The author claims that 
this inefficiency is originating in the deficiency or even in existence of planning systems 
and control process, as result, it is harder or even impossible to determinate corruption 
actions and their authors.  As a second issue, the academic put the light in the lack of 
control that each individual entity who generally when an incident happens, assume the 
responsibility but almost never take direct actions to the public officer, so is the institution 
who has to assume the penalties directly. It is because of this last point that the state has 
paid millionaires amounts by the concept of reparation or indemnities, many of them 
because of an individual bad decision taken by public officers.      
 
Finally, it is necessary to mention the incidence of the cultural issues in the corruption 
phenomenon. The faster economic development of the country since the beginning of the 
new millennium, plus the rise of a culture attached to illegal economies since the decade of 
the 80´s, made that culturally the society appreciates and recognize the money factor as an 
index of success and social status. Consequently, it is more important the money that the 
way how the people get the money, so the social cost of the corruption and the illegality as 
well it could be less than the cost of life without money. In this way is socially accepted the 
                                                          
13 CEPEDA, Fernando. La Corrupción en Colombia (The corruption in Colombia). Tercer mundo editores. 1997 
influence peddling to obtain a job in the public sector, as well as the use of public funds in 
private interest (Semana, 1994)14.  
 
Opportunities: 
One of the lessons from the M25 case is the importance of the financial institutions in any 
type of PPP Project, particularly in the DBFO model, where the private assume completely 
the financing of the project. That is why, even with strongest financial institutions, in the 
case of the M25 the government had to show their witness to sell public debt bonds as a 
way to capitalize the bidders, in case of it would be necessary. However it was not and the 
private sector was able to finance the project, showing the strongest of the financial system 
in U.K as well as the confidence in the profitability of the project.  
 
In the Colombian case, even though it is necessary to keep the proportions, the financial 
sector has been living an important growth since the decade of the 90´S of the last century, 
so the area is birthing one of the best environments in decades.  According to the 
Colombians Financial Supervision Institution in May of 2017 the assets of the financial 
sector were valued in $(COP) 1,502, billions (b), which means a real annual increase of 
8.2%. That made possible that at the end of the month the economy reaches an assets/GDP 
index of 171.09%. The report of May of 2017 form the Colombians financial supervision 
institution show an increase in the savings in middle and long term keeping the growing of 
the deposits, particularly those knows as CDT (Certificate of Term Deposit), mainly those 
with a maturity of one year or more. The CDT presented an annual real increase of 10.9%, 
                                                          
14 SEMANA. “Las Causas de la corrupción” (The causes of the corruption).  September of 1994. 
http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/las-causas-de-la-corrupcion/23515-3 
closing the month with a balance of $(COP) 158.38 b. At the same time the balance of 
savings accounts and currents accounts close the same term with a balance of $(COP) 
158.40 b and $(COP) 47.0b respectively.  
 
In the middle of 2017, the utility from Banks and financial institutions was almost $(COP) 
3.7b, a situation that has been supported in 61.5% by the total marginal interest rate. The 
positive balance of the financial institutions affects directly the conditions under this 
establishments offer financial services.  Another important financial indicator is strongest 
of the pension and service funds. According to with the same report the amount of the 
resources whose had been administrating by this funds was around $(COP) 236.7b, 
showing an increase of $(COP) 35.5 b according to the same period of one year before, that 
means that the profitability of this founds was higher than the minimum required by law 
(Super Intendencia financiera, 2017)15 
 
As well as the predecessor, the insurance sector exhibited a positive behavior, expecting an 
annual growth rate of 6.1% in the amount of the insurances policies. Consequently the 
utility of the sector was around $(COP) 875.1 mi million (mm) at the end of May of 2017, 
most of them from the life insurances companies, followed by general insurances company 
and capitalization societies with records of $(COP) 785.5 mm, $(COP)77.1mm and $(COP) 
12.2mm respectively . 
 
                                                          
15 SUPER INTENDENCIA FINANCIERA DE COLOMBIA.  Actualidad del sistema financiero de Colombia (Current 
financial system of Colombia). May of 2017 
Another important issue to be considerate, taking as an example the case of the M25 is the 
necessity to improve the transportation infrastructure. At the middle of the 90´S was 
imperative to expand the M25 Highway, as a way to increase the efficiency and the 
competitive of one of the biggest cities in Europe, also the proximity of the Sumer Olympic 
Games of 2012, to be celebrate in London, was another factor that made this project took an 
important place in the national agenda.  Backing to the Colombian case, the infrastructure 
development has been taking an important status in the governmental priorities since 2002.  
Nonetheless after the peace agreement in 2016 the government has been focusing even 
more in the necessity to make more efficient the shipping infrastructure in the country.   
The lack of transportation infrastructure in Colombia has been a big issue since the second 
half of the last century but was only at the beginning of the 2000´S when the central 
government starts to focus their interest in this area, taking almost $(COP) 6b  in 
transportation infrastructure investment in 2011, equal to 1% of the Colombians GDP.  
However, according to National Infrastructure Agency (ANI), the government planned to 
increase the investment gradually, expecting to achieve 3% of GDP in 2014, and $(COP) 8, 
5 b in 2018. Recently the emphasis   has been in many motor roads, knows as the four 
generation roads (4G), where the government pretends to achieve the territorial integration 
and to promote the competitiveness among the country. Additionally, in the National 
development plan 2014-2018, the government highlighted the importance of the private 
inversion as well as the public private partnerships as a way to overcome the infrastructure 
deficit.  
 
The ANI has insisted on the necessity to maintain the investment level as a way to achieve 
the transportation infrastructure competitive goal. Consequently, the institution shows an 
increase in the space for 
future investments.  
The graphic below 
shows the projection of 
the average levels of 
investment in 
transportation 
infrastructure until 2019, there is clearly an annual progressive increase of the space for 
coming programs, plus a regulation frame that allows the PPP from private initiative, seems 
that it is harder to find another better environment of opportunity for a private investment. 
Also, it is necessary to remember that according to the national development plan, the 
infrastructure development plays an imperative role in the peace consolidation policy. 
Therefore, the government project to develop a rural logistical platform which will 
integrate the productivity chain in rural areas with the national and international distribution 
and commercialization chain, so in that way the local economies will become stronger and 
more competitive. (DNP, 2014)16 
 
 
Threats: 
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desarrollo 2014-2018). Colombians presidency.  2014.  Page. 195 
The Public and Private Partnership model has been used in Colombia since the beginning 
of the last decade of the past century; however, it was not until the law 1508 of 2012 when 
the government created a specific legal framework to regulate and reduce the risk levels to 
the PPP investors. In the case of the M25, the experience of the Highways Agency and the 
Bidders as well in issues related with the design and the building process played an 
important role in the risk control process in this particular project. So when we analyze the 
Colombian case, even though we have many cases of successful experiences, there also are 
some situations where it is not clear the ability of the Colombian engineering to be a 
success in projects whose require high levels of engineering and design innovation.  
 
Before to continue, it is important to mention that the objective of this section it is not to 
evaluate the engineering industry in Colombia. Nonetheless, from the perspective of the 
PPP investor as well as the Public Policy building it is important to analyze some facts that 
could represent a threat in the middle and long term and that is why we will consider tree 
particular cases that could put a shadow on the efficiency of the infrastructure development 
in Colombia: First the case in Monteria in 2014, second the case of the bridge in the 106 
street in Bogotá and finally the case of the bridge of “Chirajara” in 2018. 
 
In August 04th of 2014, the structure of the under-construction bridge falls down causing 
01 death and 27 injured workers. The bridge was part of the transportation project 
“Cordoba-Sucre”. This is one of the most important transportation infrastructure projects in 
the Caribbean region, particularly in the departments of Cordoba and Sucre. The project 
was awarded in 2007, by the national government,   to a private society called “Autopista 
de la Sabana SAS” under a partnership model who transfer to the private the responsibility 
of build, design, finance, and operation of many roads to connect this two departments in 
the Caribbean region. The project included the construction of 120km of 4 lines highways 
and the rehabilitation of 250km of motor roads in the region. The incident occurred on a 
bridge that pretends to provide easy access to the airport close to Monteria, the capital city 
of Cordoba’s department. Nonetheless, according to a regional journal report, the accident 
occurred because of miscalculations of the engineers. So, one of the pillars of the structure 
falls down because it was unable to support the weight of the reinforced concrete (El 
Heraldo, 2014)17. 
 
The second case occurred in February of 2015 in Bogotá, Colombia’s capital city, where a 
pedestrian bridge that pretend overpass a 4 lines avenue fall down during the resistance test, 
causing 42 injured people, including many soldiers who were used to exam the bridge 
resistance. The Colombian Army was the owner of the project, who’s hired a construction 
company, known as “Constructec S.A” to build the pedestrian bridge with a cost of $3.195 
million of Colombian pesos (approx. US $1 million).  According to Javier Pava, Principal 
of the District Management Risk Institute (Instituto Distrital de Gestión del Riesgo, 
IDIGER), “at the time of the resistance test there was a displacement of the mast, which is 
the base of the eastern side, because there was an overvoltage in the bridge, that is, the 
tensors or cables with which the work was being done to sustain the bridge had an excess of 
force due to the load. That greater effort, apparently, caused the failure” (El Tiempo, 
                                                          
17 EL HERALDO. “27 heridos y un atrapado por caída de puente en construcción en Montería” (27 injured and 
one caught by falling bridge under construction in Montería).  04th August of 2014.  
https://www.elheraldo.co/cordoba/se-cae-el-puente-de-los-garzones-en-monteria-161604 
2015) 18. In other words, once again an engineer and design miscalculation caused the 
collapse of a bridge.   
 
Finally and perhaps the most relevant case occurred at noon in January of 2018, in the 4 
lines project highway between Bogotá and the city of Villavicencio in Meta´s department at 
the Orinoquia´s region.  The bridge was part of a concession project known as “motorway 
Bogotá – Villavicencio” awarded to Conviandes, a company lead by The Aval Group, one 
of the most important financial groups in Colombia.  The bidder has been ahead of the 
motorway between Bogotá and Villavicencio since August of 1994 when the INCO (Today 
National Infrastructure Agency ANI) transfer to the company the maintenance and 
operation of the motorway. Additionally, in January of 2010, the central government 
awarded to the same company the widening project of the highway from 2 to 4 lines. This 
widening project includes the building of 18 new tunnels, 42 new bridges and the 
construction of 33.8Km of 4 line highway.  
 
The accident occurred in one of the bridges in a sector knows as “Chirajara”. According to 
Mexpresa, one of the project auditors, the fail of the structure was caused by a 
miscalculation during the design process, the auditor company mention that "there is a 
deficiency in the design of bracing system between tower columns in the direction change 
section" (Portafolio, 2018) 19. Consequently, experts in the topic as Marco A. Hinojosa, 
                                                          
18 EL TIEMPO. ¿Por qué se cayó el puente peatonal de la carrera 11 con 103?   (Why did the pedestrian 
bridge of race 11 fall with 103?). February 2nd of 2015. http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-
15182335 
19 PORTAFOLIO.  “Un error de diseño habría sido la causa del desplome del puente de Chirajara”  (A design 
error would have been the cause of the collapse of the Chirajara bridge). 
from another auditor company, recommend making a safe demolition, which avoids the risk 
for both people and the surrounding structures (Portafolio, 2018). However, the 
construction company has argued the necessity of a second opinion about the topic and 
insisted in the importance of keeping and reinforce the existent structure.  
 
At this point it is important to insist that objective of this thesis is not to evaluate the 
engineer quality in Colombia. Nonetheless, cases as those whose were explain before could 
be a threat, particularly to the private investor, whose probably will examine deeper the real 
capacity of the enginery before any invest in public infrastructure in Colombia,   mainly in 
a BTL as well as in a DBOF project where the private assume the construction risk.   
 
Another treat, that it is necessary to consider in this section in this section, is that most of 
the area, where the transportation infrastructure is needed, is part of the Colombian 
Amazonia. Consequently, many voices, as the Corporation for Sustainable Development of 
north and west of the Amazonia (Corporación para el Desarrollo Sostenible del Norte y el 
Oriente Amazónica  CDA) has argued that the development of roads and transportation 
infrastructure will increase the deforestation and the colonization process in the area.  In 
fact, the most emblematic case has occurred in the department of Guaviare, where the 
governor of the department has been insisting in the importance of expansion and 
rehabilitation of a motor road between the municipalities of Calamar and Miraflores. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.portafolio.co/economia/infraestructura/causas-de-la-caida-del-puente-de-chirajara-513797   
January 31st   of 2018.  
The motor road of 138km in the middle of the jungle is the center of the debate between 
environmental organizations, like the CDA, and regional authorities.   On one hand, the 
regional government argued about the importance of the infrastructure development for the 
citizen’s social welfare, according to Ramiro Álvarez, Chef of public infrastructure 
development in the department of Guaviare, “Sending 1 ton of cargo by river costs $ (COP) 
300,000. By air, $(COP) 1,500,000, and by land would cost $ (COP) 180,000“. 20  On the 
other hand, voices as Roberto Gómez, from the Natura organization, claim about the 
necessity of keeping the motor road, but unpaved, increasing the presence of the 
environmental police and other institutions who prevent the expansion of the deforestation 
process.   
 
The motor road of 138km in the middle of the jungle is the center of the debate between 
environmental organizations, like the CDA, and regional authorities.   On one hand, the 
regional government argued about the importance of the infrastructure development for the 
citizen’s social welfare, according to Ramiro Álvarez, Chef of public infrastructure  
development in department of Guaviare, “Sending 1 ton of cargo by river costs $ (COP) 
300,000. By air, $(COP) 1,500,000, and by land would cost $ (COP) 180,000. "On the 
other hand, voices as Roberto Gómez, from the Natura organization, claim about the 
necessity of keeping the motor road, but unpaved, increasing the presence of the 
environmental police and other institutions who prevent the expansion of the deforestation 
process.    
                                                          
20 CALLE, Helena. Tres carreteras que amenazan al pulmón más grande del planeta (Three roads that 
threaten the planet's largest lung). https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/medio-ambiente/tres-
carreteras-que-amenazan-al-pulmon-mas-grande-del-planeta-articulo-711757  September 5th of 2017. 
STRONGEST WEAKNES 
• Private investor tax incentives in the 
most affected by the conflict zones 
(ZOMAC). 
• Legal stability contracts (CEJ) 
 
• Weak specialized and independent 
institutions, in particular the National 
Infrastructure Agency (ANI). 
• High corruption Index 
OPORTUNITIES THREATS 
• Strongest national financial system. 
• Political wiliness to invest in 
transportation infrastructure 
Quality of Colombian engineering, design and 
innovation capacity. 
Environmental impact, particularly in the 
Amazonia region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In terms of public policy, it is harder to think in a new anti-corruption legal framework in 
the Colombian case, because in fact the country already has an important body of laws 
against the corruption issue, most of them following international norms and standards. 
According to the last report of the OECD, Colombia has made significant progress in 
implementing its anti-corruption framework (OECD, 2018)21 However, even though most 
of these norms exist in the paper, they have not been implemented and enforced. That could 
be explained by the fragility and lack of independence of the institutions who are involved 
in the policymaker process as well as those who are in charge of auditory and public 
resources control. Consequently, the efforts in terms of corruption should be focus on three 
significant points: strongest, independent and specialized institutions. 
 
As it was mention before, the main institution who's supposed to be ahead with everything 
concern to the PPP projects it should be the ANI, but the institution lacks human capital 
with enough knowledge and the sufficient experience to manage and made more efficient 
the project making process. This could be explained because the selection process of the 
public officers in this area used to obey to political compromises more than to real 
professional requirements. So, the professionalization of the public officers following an 
accomplishment and career system could be an interest option to enforce the institution. 
 
As a second point, the independence of the institutions is another issue that affect and 
contribute to the higher corruption index in the country, because even though the country 
has many institutions in charge of the vigilance and control of public resources as the 
                                                          
21 OECD. “Phase 2 follow-up report on implementing the OECD anti-bribery convention in Colombia”. 
February of 2018.  
Contraloria (fiscal control) and the Procurator office (disciplinary vigilance of public 
servants), the selection of the officer ahead of those institutions generally is affected or 
influenced by a powerful presidential system. Consequently, it is very common that these 
control institutions lose independence and efficiency and can be condescending and even 
neglect with their regulation and supervision functions. This scenario is not better in the 
case of institutions like the ANI who is under the control of the presidential office, so their 
budget and human resource depend on the political will of the executive power. 
 
Finally and directly related with the points mentioned above, a stronger institutional frame 
requires more specialized institutions, in the case of Colombia the PPP projects necessary 
involve the active participation of the ANI and National Committee for Social and 
Economic Policy (CONPES), however the last one also depends on the head of the 
executive, so in terms of corruption control it is limited their actions with more emphasis 
on macroeconomic management and works more as a formality. The experience of the M-
25 showed the importance of a technical institution whose experience and credibility 
generate confidences into the potential investors.    
    
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
• The M25 Orbital Motorway is one of the most interesting and meaningful cases 
where a transportation infrastructure project was financed build and operated by the 
private sector, under a public private partnership model.  This experience teaches us 
the importance of a stronger public partner as a warranted who attracts and reduces 
uncertainty levels for the private investor. Also, the M25 experience showed the 
necessity of strongest public institutions, as the UK Highway Agency. The role of 
this institution was vital in all of the phases of the project, particularly during the 
bidder selection and in the project design as well.    
 
• In terms of threats, the Colombian case has showed two big challenges. On one 
hand, the environmental impact could be a big issue, particularly because most of 
the most affected by the conflict zones (ZOMAC) are located in the amazonic area, 
consequently any project in this area has to minimize their environmental impact, 
situation that in most of the cases might increase the cost of the project.  On the 
other hand, we are facing a difficult in the credibility of the Colombian enginery; 
cases like   the bridge of “Chirajara” or the bridge in Monteria could scare away 
private investors and increase transactions costs.  
 
• As it was mention before the institutions play an important role in the public private 
partnership models, consequently the relative instability of the Institutions in charge 
of infrastructure projects in Colombia, like the ANI (before INCO) is a comparative 
weakness, because the private partner would have doubts about the security and 
profitability of any project in the middle and long term. Additionally, the corruption 
structure in the country and the low transparence levels reduce the efficiency of the 
public system and increase the transaction cost for the private as well as for the 
public partner.  
 • In this context and as policy recommendation, it is necessary to remember that one 
of the most important task that the government has to achieved in the way to make 
more efficient and attractive the investment in public policies by privates partners is 
the reinforcement of the institutions, particularly the technical fortification and the 
independence of the ANI. Additionally and even though many studies have agreed 
that the community participation not necessary will reduce the corruption levels (J-
PAL, 2008)22 , it is necessary to involve the community in the policy build process 
as well as in all the stages of the public private partnership project. 
 
• Finally, it is a fact that every peace process has to be followed by a big investment 
because in most of the cases the devastation of the war affects politically and 
economically to the society who has been affected by the conflict. The Colombian 
case is not the exception, the lack of investment and presence of the central 
government in those areas who have been affected by the war and the deficiency of 
infrastructure development supported the increase of illegal economies. Therefore, 
it has to be a priority for any government to close this infrastructure gap. In this 
context, and considering limited public resources in the short term, public and 
private partnerships models like de DBFO and BTL seem as an interesting 
alternative to support to the central government in these post-conflict scenarios. And 
experiences as the M-25 in U.K showed that these types of PPP projects are 
possible even in big infrastructure projects. Nonetheless, in the Colombian case, 
                                                          
22 The Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL). Routes to reduced corruption. J-PAL Policy Briefcase, 
March 2008 
issues like the corruption and the management of the environmental impact could 
increase the risks and the cost of any project reducing their attractiveness for the 
private partner. So, in the Colombian case, it is necessary to improve the public 
institutions (like the ANI) and design a public mechanism to support the private 
investment in infrastructure projects, the Treasury´s new infrastructure finance unit 
(TIFU) in U.K could be a good example of those mechanisms.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
